McCain Loses 2 Veteran Iowa Strategists
(...) John McCain's campaign is losing two veteran Republican strategists in Iowa and will report a seven-figure debt for the second quarter in a row, back-to-back blows to a presidential bid still reeling from a major staff shake-up earlier this week.
Ed Failor Jr., said Thursday that he and Karen Slifka plan to notify McCain by letter of their decisions to leave. Both are GOP operatives with deep ties in Iowa, which holds the first-in-the-nation caucuses, and national politics.
"As much as I like Senator McCain, it's not a team I'm willing to stay involved with any longer," Failor said. (...)
sábado, 14 de julio de 2007
jueves, 12 de julio de 2007
Macua Presidente
Macua: 6.888 (39,88%)
Ercoreca: 6.138 (35,54%)
González: 2.034 (11,78%)
En Blanco: 2.025 (11,72%)
miércoles, 11 de julio de 2007
1968 GOP Presidential Primary
En las primarias republicanas de 1968 tenemos una de las más sorprendentes y ejemplares historias de superación que ha presenciado la política en las últimas décadas. La resurrección del hasta entonces "eterno perdedor" Richard Nixon para convertirse en uno de los más destacados estadistas del Siglo XX.
A los votantes nunca les gustó Dick Nixon. Un hombre tímido, de una personalidad insegura y atormentada que le hacía parecer moralmente dudoso y falto de principios ante el público. Muchos lo aborrecían pero nadie ponía en cuestión su talento político, ni su experiencia y preparación para asumir la Presidencia. Cada campaña de Nixon desencadenaba percepciones contradictorias entre los electores. Debemos entender su ascenso en 1968 como un voto de censura del pueblo a un Partido Demócrata dividido y alejado de la realidad.
Por fin Nixon encontró la manera de destacar en campaña sus cualidades presidenciables por encima de los sentimentos generales que su personalidad pudiera desatar. Pero el gran factor que lo llevó a cosneguir la nominación y después la Presidencia, fue su capacidad de sobrevivir, de perdurar. Aquel año también asistimos a la sorprendente selección de Spiro Agnew como candidato a la Vicepresidencia. Una selección inesperada que resultó muy acertada en el corto plazo, pero que se convirtió en una pesada carga con el paso del tiempo.
Los más destacados candidatos que optaron a la nominación republicana fueron: el Senador Clifford Case, de New Jersey; el ex Vicepresidente Richard Nixon; el Gobernador Ronald Reagan, de California; el Gobernador Jim Rhodes, de Ohio; el Gobernador Nelson Rockefeller, de Nueva York; el Gobernador George Romney, de Michigan; y el ex Gobernador Harold Stassen, de Minnesota.
Fuentes: Wikipedia, Union Leader y Time.
(...) Tired in Los Angeles and seeking a fresh start after the 1962 gubernatorial debacle, Nixon moved to New York City, where he became a senior partner in the leading law firm Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander. During the 1966 Congressional elections, he stumped the country in support of Republican candidates, rebuilding his base in the party and preparing his remarkable political comeback. He was the front-runner for the Republican nomination in 1968, and to a great extent the story of the Republican primary campaign and nomination is the story of one Nixon opponent entering the race and then dropping out.
Polling done for Nixon in 1967 told him that while the voters sampled considered the former vice president experienced, intelligent and able to deal with foreign policy matters and leaders, he was also perceived as a loser always running for the Presidency but unable to achieve it, someone similar to Harold Stassen.
Nixon had not won a general election in his own right since 1950, when he defeated Helen Gahagan Douglas for a United States Senate seat in California. Nixon had to overcome not only his loss to John Kennedy in 1960, but also his humiliating defeat by Edmund G. "Pat" Brown for the governorship of the Golden State in 1962.
Nixon's first challenger was Michigan Governor George W. Romney. A Gallup poll in mid-1967 showed Nixon with 39%, followed by Romney with 25%. However, in a slip of the tongue, Romney told a news reporter that he had been "brainwashed" by the military and the diplomatic corps into supporting the Vietnam War; the remark led to weeks of ridicule in the national news media. As the year 1968 opened, Romney was opposed to further American intervention in Vietnam and had decided to run as the Republican version of Eugene McCarthy (New York Times 2/18/1968).
George Romney was advised not to challenge Nixon in New Hampshire, and instead await the Wisconsin primary on April 2. It was believed by some advisers that the conservative nature of New Hampshire's Republicans and Nixon's popularity among its leaders and rank-and-file were too strong for Romney to overcome, and he should begin his quest for the nomination in a state closer in both ideology and geography. Although Romney's campaign was technically proficient, had adequate funding, operated hundreds of home headquarters in operation and mounted an elaborate media blitz, it never caught on. Romney's support faded slowly, and he withdrew from the race on February 28, 1968. (New York Times 2/29/1968).
Nixon won a resounding victory in the important New Hampshire primary on March 12, winning 78% of the vote. Antiwar Republicans wrote in the name of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the leader of the GOP's liberal wing, who received 11% of the vote and became Nixon's new challenger. Nixon led Rockefeller in the polls throughout the primary campaign. Rockefeller defeated Nixon in the Massachusetts primary on April 30 but otherwise fared poorly in the state primaries and conventions. Nelson Rockefeller, while a strong and attractive candidate in many ways, never fully understood the differences between the politics of nomination and the politics of election.
En la imagen: Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney y Ronald Reagan, 1968.
By early spring, California Governor Ronald Reagan, the moral leader of the GOP's conservative wing, had become Nixon's chief rival. In the Nebraska primary on May 14, Nixon won with 70% of the vote to 21% for Reagan and 5% for Rockefeller. While this was a wide margin for Nixon, Reagan remained Nixon's leading challenger. Nixon won the next primary of importance, Oregon, on May 15 with 65% of the vote and won all the following primaries except for California (June 4), where only Reagan appeared on the ballot. Reagan's margin in California gave him a plurality of the nationwide primary vote, but when the Republican National Convention assembled, Nixon had 656 delegates according to a UPI poll (with 667 needed for the nomination).
Logistical plans for the 1968 Republican National Convention were already being made by Nixon in Miami Beach, Florida. Nixon established a virtual colony in Miami Beach populated by 500 staffers and roughly 1,000 volunteers. An elaborate telephone and radio communications system was created. Besides command posts in Nixon's hotel and in a trailer outside Convention Hall, branch operations were maintained in 35 hotels housing delegates. Nixon had assembled a talented crew of old and new aides from in and out of politics and from varying ideological backgrounds.
En la imagen: Richard Nixon en campaña, 1968
During the three convention days leading up to the balloting, the main maneuvering centered on three elements: 1) a handful of uncommitted delegations, of which Maryland, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were the most important; 2) the South, which was largely in Nixon's camp already but vulnerable to Reagan; and 3) Nixon's choice of a running mate. Reagan and Rockefeller planned to unite their forces in a stop-Nixon movement, but the strategy fell apart when neither man agreed to support the other for the nomination. Rumors that Nixon was going to pick a liberal as a running mate were everywhere. When a Miami paper printed a front-page story that it would be Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield, Rockefeller's and Reagan's men distributed 3,000 copies on the convention floor to make sure that no one missed the point.
Nixon backers denied the report, but the most effective disclaimer came from Nixon in private meetings with Southerners. "I won't do anything that would hurt development of the two-party system in the South," Nixon told them. "I won't take anybody that I have to shove down the throats of any section of the country." Thus such Nixon loyalists as Party Chairman Harry Dent of South Carolina were able to tell skeptics on the floor: "I've got it written in blood."
Nixon was also artfully placating Southerners on certain sensitive issues. The Miami Herald managed to get a tape recorder into one of the private sessions. In the transcript it printed later, which Nixon's spokesmen did not knock down, he explained his public support of this year's open-housing civil rights bill as a matter of political tactics rather than conviction. "I felt then and I feel now," said the transcript, "that conditions are different in different parts of the country." But he wanted the issue "out of sight" so as not to divide the party and risk a platform fight. The Southerners also remembered Nixon's criticism of Johnson's Supreme Court appointments. While Nixon did not quarrel with Abe Fortas' designation on personal grounds, the Southerners who did looked kindly on Nixon's position.
Vote projections by the networks and the wire services bounced about a bit between Monday and Wednesday, while Rockefeller men insisted on talking about the "erosion" of Nixon's strength. The most accurate count, as it turned out, was by the Nixon organization, which earlier had talked about 700 and privately refined its calculations to 702. Needed to be nominated: 667. As the nominating speech droned on, Nixon visited his command trailer outside the hall and got word that a first- ballot victory was assured. As the roll call progressed, it was obvious that Nixon was faring exactly as he had expected. He won the nomination on the first ballot.
En la imagen: Richard Nixon y Spiro Agnew en la portada de Time.
With scarcely time out for a round of congratulations, the candidate plunged into a round robin of meetings with advisers, aides and party leaders about the vice-presidential nomination. New York Mayor John Lindsay, probably the most discussed possibility up to that point, was dismissed early as too unpopular among conservatives. John Gardner was briefly mentioned, soon dropped. Among others considered were Reagan and Texas Senator John Tower, both of whom would have antagonized liberals. Hatfield, Romney and Keynoter Dan Evans were mentioned, then Tennessee Senator Howard Baker.
The possibilities had been reduced to five: Senator Charles Percy of Illinois; Lieutenant Governor Robert Finch of California, a longtime Nixon friend and associate; Congressman Rogers Morton of Maryland; Governor John Volpe of Massachusetts ("It might be nice," Nixon observed, "to have an Italian Catholic on the ticket"); and, of course, Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland.
It was past noon when Nixon ended the talks by observing: "Well, I think the meeting has accomplished about all that it can accomplish." Morton put in a call to Agnew. "Are you sitting down?" Morton inquired. Nixon got on the phone and broke the news. "I'm overwhelmed," said Agnew, whose stoic expression rarely admits of such a condition. (...)
A los votantes nunca les gustó Dick Nixon. Un hombre tímido, de una personalidad insegura y atormentada que le hacía parecer moralmente dudoso y falto de principios ante el público. Muchos lo aborrecían pero nadie ponía en cuestión su talento político, ni su experiencia y preparación para asumir la Presidencia. Cada campaña de Nixon desencadenaba percepciones contradictorias entre los electores. Debemos entender su ascenso en 1968 como un voto de censura del pueblo a un Partido Demócrata dividido y alejado de la realidad.
Por fin Nixon encontró la manera de destacar en campaña sus cualidades presidenciables por encima de los sentimentos generales que su personalidad pudiera desatar. Pero el gran factor que lo llevó a cosneguir la nominación y después la Presidencia, fue su capacidad de sobrevivir, de perdurar. Aquel año también asistimos a la sorprendente selección de Spiro Agnew como candidato a la Vicepresidencia. Una selección inesperada que resultó muy acertada en el corto plazo, pero que se convirtió en una pesada carga con el paso del tiempo.
Los más destacados candidatos que optaron a la nominación republicana fueron: el Senador Clifford Case, de New Jersey; el ex Vicepresidente Richard Nixon; el Gobernador Ronald Reagan, de California; el Gobernador Jim Rhodes, de Ohio; el Gobernador Nelson Rockefeller, de Nueva York; el Gobernador George Romney, de Michigan; y el ex Gobernador Harold Stassen, de Minnesota.
Fuentes: Wikipedia, Union Leader y Time.
(...) Tired in Los Angeles and seeking a fresh start after the 1962 gubernatorial debacle, Nixon moved to New York City, where he became a senior partner in the leading law firm Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander. During the 1966 Congressional elections, he stumped the country in support of Republican candidates, rebuilding his base in the party and preparing his remarkable political comeback. He was the front-runner for the Republican nomination in 1968, and to a great extent the story of the Republican primary campaign and nomination is the story of one Nixon opponent entering the race and then dropping out.
Polling done for Nixon in 1967 told him that while the voters sampled considered the former vice president experienced, intelligent and able to deal with foreign policy matters and leaders, he was also perceived as a loser always running for the Presidency but unable to achieve it, someone similar to Harold Stassen.
Nixon had not won a general election in his own right since 1950, when he defeated Helen Gahagan Douglas for a United States Senate seat in California. Nixon had to overcome not only his loss to John Kennedy in 1960, but also his humiliating defeat by Edmund G. "Pat" Brown for the governorship of the Golden State in 1962.
Nixon's first challenger was Michigan Governor George W. Romney. A Gallup poll in mid-1967 showed Nixon with 39%, followed by Romney with 25%. However, in a slip of the tongue, Romney told a news reporter that he had been "brainwashed" by the military and the diplomatic corps into supporting the Vietnam War; the remark led to weeks of ridicule in the national news media. As the year 1968 opened, Romney was opposed to further American intervention in Vietnam and had decided to run as the Republican version of Eugene McCarthy (New York Times 2/18/1968).
George Romney was advised not to challenge Nixon in New Hampshire, and instead await the Wisconsin primary on April 2. It was believed by some advisers that the conservative nature of New Hampshire's Republicans and Nixon's popularity among its leaders and rank-and-file were too strong for Romney to overcome, and he should begin his quest for the nomination in a state closer in both ideology and geography. Although Romney's campaign was technically proficient, had adequate funding, operated hundreds of home headquarters in operation and mounted an elaborate media blitz, it never caught on. Romney's support faded slowly, and he withdrew from the race on February 28, 1968. (New York Times 2/29/1968).
Nixon won a resounding victory in the important New Hampshire primary on March 12, winning 78% of the vote. Antiwar Republicans wrote in the name of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the leader of the GOP's liberal wing, who received 11% of the vote and became Nixon's new challenger. Nixon led Rockefeller in the polls throughout the primary campaign. Rockefeller defeated Nixon in the Massachusetts primary on April 30 but otherwise fared poorly in the state primaries and conventions. Nelson Rockefeller, while a strong and attractive candidate in many ways, never fully understood the differences between the politics of nomination and the politics of election.
En la imagen: Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney y Ronald Reagan, 1968.By early spring, California Governor Ronald Reagan, the moral leader of the GOP's conservative wing, had become Nixon's chief rival. In the Nebraska primary on May 14, Nixon won with 70% of the vote to 21% for Reagan and 5% for Rockefeller. While this was a wide margin for Nixon, Reagan remained Nixon's leading challenger. Nixon won the next primary of importance, Oregon, on May 15 with 65% of the vote and won all the following primaries except for California (June 4), where only Reagan appeared on the ballot. Reagan's margin in California gave him a plurality of the nationwide primary vote, but when the Republican National Convention assembled, Nixon had 656 delegates according to a UPI poll (with 667 needed for the nomination).
Logistical plans for the 1968 Republican National Convention were already being made by Nixon in Miami Beach, Florida. Nixon established a virtual colony in Miami Beach populated by 500 staffers and roughly 1,000 volunteers. An elaborate telephone and radio communications system was created. Besides command posts in Nixon's hotel and in a trailer outside Convention Hall, branch operations were maintained in 35 hotels housing delegates. Nixon had assembled a talented crew of old and new aides from in and out of politics and from varying ideological backgrounds.
En la imagen: Richard Nixon en campaña, 1968During the three convention days leading up to the balloting, the main maneuvering centered on three elements: 1) a handful of uncommitted delegations, of which Maryland, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were the most important; 2) the South, which was largely in Nixon's camp already but vulnerable to Reagan; and 3) Nixon's choice of a running mate. Reagan and Rockefeller planned to unite their forces in a stop-Nixon movement, but the strategy fell apart when neither man agreed to support the other for the nomination. Rumors that Nixon was going to pick a liberal as a running mate were everywhere. When a Miami paper printed a front-page story that it would be Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield, Rockefeller's and Reagan's men distributed 3,000 copies on the convention floor to make sure that no one missed the point.
Nixon backers denied the report, but the most effective disclaimer came from Nixon in private meetings with Southerners. "I won't do anything that would hurt development of the two-party system in the South," Nixon told them. "I won't take anybody that I have to shove down the throats of any section of the country." Thus such Nixon loyalists as Party Chairman Harry Dent of South Carolina were able to tell skeptics on the floor: "I've got it written in blood."
Nixon was also artfully placating Southerners on certain sensitive issues. The Miami Herald managed to get a tape recorder into one of the private sessions. In the transcript it printed later, which Nixon's spokesmen did not knock down, he explained his public support of this year's open-housing civil rights bill as a matter of political tactics rather than conviction. "I felt then and I feel now," said the transcript, "that conditions are different in different parts of the country." But he wanted the issue "out of sight" so as not to divide the party and risk a platform fight. The Southerners also remembered Nixon's criticism of Johnson's Supreme Court appointments. While Nixon did not quarrel with Abe Fortas' designation on personal grounds, the Southerners who did looked kindly on Nixon's position.
Vote projections by the networks and the wire services bounced about a bit between Monday and Wednesday, while Rockefeller men insisted on talking about the "erosion" of Nixon's strength. The most accurate count, as it turned out, was by the Nixon organization, which earlier had talked about 700 and privately refined its calculations to 702. Needed to be nominated: 667. As the nominating speech droned on, Nixon visited his command trailer outside the hall and got word that a first- ballot victory was assured. As the roll call progressed, it was obvious that Nixon was faring exactly as he had expected. He won the nomination on the first ballot.
En la imagen: Richard Nixon y Spiro Agnew en la portada de Time.With scarcely time out for a round of congratulations, the candidate plunged into a round robin of meetings with advisers, aides and party leaders about the vice-presidential nomination. New York Mayor John Lindsay, probably the most discussed possibility up to that point, was dismissed early as too unpopular among conservatives. John Gardner was briefly mentioned, soon dropped. Among others considered were Reagan and Texas Senator John Tower, both of whom would have antagonized liberals. Hatfield, Romney and Keynoter Dan Evans were mentioned, then Tennessee Senator Howard Baker.
The possibilities had been reduced to five: Senator Charles Percy of Illinois; Lieutenant Governor Robert Finch of California, a longtime Nixon friend and associate; Congressman Rogers Morton of Maryland; Governor John Volpe of Massachusetts ("It might be nice," Nixon observed, "to have an Italian Catholic on the ticket"); and, of course, Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland.
It was past noon when Nixon ended the talks by observing: "Well, I think the meeting has accomplished about all that it can accomplish." Morton put in a call to Agnew. "Are you sitting down?" Morton inquired. Nixon got on the phone and broke the news. "I'm overwhelmed," said Agnew, whose stoic expression rarely admits of such a condition. (...)
Lady Bird Johnson
Fue Primera Dama de EEUU entre 1963 y 1969. Ha muerto hoy a los 94 años en Austin, Texas.Nacida en el estado de la estrella solitaria a principios del Siglo XX, acompañó a su marido en su aventura política en Washington DC desde que fue elegido por primera vez miembro de la Cámara de Representantes en 1937. Él tenía 29 años y ella 25. Allí permanecerían hasta el 20 de enero de 1969, cuando volvieron a Texas definitivamente tras haberse codeado con todos los estadistas mundiales.
Que vote San Mamés
A la espera de las elecciones de mañana, coloco este interesante reportaje que publicó El Correo hace una semanas haciendo un repaso a lo que han sido las elecciones del Athletic en los últimos 30 años. Desde que la elección se realiza por sufragio universal de todos los socios. Un socio, un voto.
Que vote San Mamés
(...) «Un socio, un voto». Ésta fue la revolucionaria promesa con la que Beti Duñabeitia se presentó a las elecciones en 1977. El propietario de 'El mundo elegante', un conocido comercio bilbaíno, había sido directivo en la junta de José Antonio Eguidazu, pero decidió dimitir el 8 de junio de 1976. El ex jugador José Luis Artetxe hizo lo mismo. La razón aducida por Duñabeitia para irse -así lo dijo en una entrevista concedida al diario 'Hierro'- fue la de «incompatibilidad de opiniones» con la directiva, que esos días se encontraba sumergida en el culebrón que supuso encontrar sustituto a Rafa Iriondo en el banquillo rojiblanco. Aunque no trascendiera públicamente, era evidente que una de las razones de esta incompatibilidad tenía que ver con la política. El PNV preparaba su regreso al Athletic cuarenta años después. (...)
Que vote San Mamés
(...) «Un socio, un voto». Ésta fue la revolucionaria promesa con la que Beti Duñabeitia se presentó a las elecciones en 1977. El propietario de 'El mundo elegante', un conocido comercio bilbaíno, había sido directivo en la junta de José Antonio Eguidazu, pero decidió dimitir el 8 de junio de 1976. El ex jugador José Luis Artetxe hizo lo mismo. La razón aducida por Duñabeitia para irse -así lo dijo en una entrevista concedida al diario 'Hierro'- fue la de «incompatibilidad de opiniones» con la directiva, que esos días se encontraba sumergida en el culebrón que supuso encontrar sustituto a Rafa Iriondo en el banquillo rojiblanco. Aunque no trascendiera públicamente, era evidente que una de las razones de esta incompatibilidad tenía que ver con la política. El PNV preparaba su regreso al Athletic cuarenta años después. (...)
Nuevo Presidente para el Athletic
Mañana se celebran elecciones a la Presidencia del Athletic Club de Bilbao. El asunto no entra dentro de la temática de mi blog pero tenía ganas de hablar de ello. No soy socio, por lo que no podré votar. Pero he seguido con mucho interés esta campaña porque puede ser un momento crucial en la historia de un club centenario que acaba de dar por terminada la peor temporada de su historia. Hay que elegir entre 3 candidatos: Fernando García Macua, Juan Carlos Ercoreca y Javier González de Garazi.
Macua, hombre del establishment vizcaíno, cuando anunció su postulación era percibido como el candidato favorito de la oligarquía de Neguri y de las antiguas familias franquistas adineradas que en las últimas elecciones apoyaron a Juan Pedro Guzmán. Existía también la sospecha de que iba avalado por el mega-constructor Jabyer Fernández, presidente de Fonorte y el Grupo Afer, lo que le garantizaba a Macua también el apoyo de una parte del sector adinerado del PNV. Sin olvidar que es sobrino de José María Makua Zarandona, el que fuera Presidente de la Diputación de Bizkaia en los años 80 por el PNV.
No me inspiraba demasiada confianza en un principio. Me parecía el típico abogado que se presta a ejercer de "hombre de paja" al servicio de oscuros intereses que mueven los hilos en las sombras. El constructor Jabyer Fernández, con la colaboración de gente como Jon Arrinda, ya se hicieron en su día con el control de Bilbao Basket o Kaiku, y las malas lenguas decían que ahora preparaban su desembarco a lo grande en el Athletic a través de la candidatura de Macua y apoyados en el Grupo Correo.
Pero creo que durante la campaña el candidato ha demostrado tener personalidad propia y, sobre todo, ser el más creíble de los tres. Se ha desvinculado de cualquier compromiso con las empresas de Fernández y ha potenciado una imagen de autonomía respecto de los poderes económicos y políticos que me ha gustado. Era muy escéptico sobre sus intenciones, pero a día de hoy me parece el hombre más creíble, aquel que puede materializar sus promesos y devolver al Athletic la ambición perdida. Se ha esforzado más que el resto por hacerse con el apoyo de un amplio abanico de personas y sensibilidades distintas dentro del entorno social del club, configurando una plataforma que me recuerda mucho a la presentada por el difunto Javier Uría en 2001.
Juan Carlos Ercoreca me cae bien. Es empresario del sector alimenticio, dueño de una conocida cadena de supermercados en Euzkadi. Se le ve buena persona. Con intenciones limpias. Pero el hombre no tiene madera de candidato. Puede tener un buen proyecto deportivo asesorado por el experto alemán Horst Wein, pero no sabe venderlo. Su estrategia mediática ha sido pobre y limitada. Ha patinado anunciando a un inexperto Julen Guerrero, una figura polarizante, como su director deportivo.
Su mayor activo es el apoyo de una gran mayoría de ex futbolistas. Sobre todo de futbolistas que estuvieron en el club en los años del Presidente José María Arrate. Seguramente porque Ercoreca representa la continuación de esa élite llamada "los Arrate Boys" que han presidido el club desde 1994 y hasta ahora ininterrumpidamente. Gentes del entorno del ex Presidente Arrate, quien ha sido el dirigente rojiblanco más mimado por el PNV, que puso a su disposición toda su maquinaria de movilización de votantes en 1994 para derrotar a José Julián Lertxundi.
Por ello Ercoreca, apoyado públicamente por Arrate, ha sido considerado por muchos el candidato oficial de Sabin Etxea (ejecutiva nacional del PNV). Pero ha dado la sensación de ir perdiendo poco a poco ese supuesto apoyo. Especialmente porque en el partido no ha habido unanimidad. El candidato soñado del partido, especialmente de Iñigo Urkullu, presidente del Bizkai Buru Batzar, hombre fuerte de Imaz en Bizkaia, era el ex jugador y ex capitán del equipo, Genar Andrinua. Pero ante la negativa de este a presentarse, ha habido figuras del PNV vizcaíno, como el Diputado General José Luis Bilbao, que han podido posicionarse oficiosamente con Macua, facilitando a este el apoyo de medios locales como TeleBilbao, al tiempo que el partido oficialmente parecía apoyar sin demasiado entusiasmo a un poco ilusionante Juan Carlos Ercoreca.
Pero en las últimas semanas, también a la vista de la poca efectividad de Ercoreca haciendo campaña y sus pobres números en las encuestas, Macua ha parecido convencer más a parte del aparato de propaganda del partido. Con la colaboración de compañeros de plancha como Joseba Intxaurraga, antiguo consejero del Lendakari Ardanza, que sería Vicepresidente del Athletic si Macua gana las elecciones.
Por último, tenemos al tercer candidato. El freaky Javier González. Un ex agente de futbolistas que no me gusta un pelo. Es una mezcla entre el ex Presidente Fernando Lamikiz y Dimitri Piterman. Un cutre. No da la talla como Presidente y las formas le pierden. A la mínima dificultad perdería todo el temperamento. Está basando toda su campaña en el descrédito facilón de los demás. Un populismo cutre que cree que puede funcionar con una masa social muy deprimida y cabreada después de dos años deportivamente nefastos. Si es elegido Presidente y hace bien las cosas, no tendré problemas en reconocerlo. Pero de momento sólo puedo decir que me desagrada.
Así pues, me quedo con Macua.
Macua, hombre del establishment vizcaíno, cuando anunció su postulación era percibido como el candidato favorito de la oligarquía de Neguri y de las antiguas familias franquistas adineradas que en las últimas elecciones apoyaron a Juan Pedro Guzmán. Existía también la sospecha de que iba avalado por el mega-constructor Jabyer Fernández, presidente de Fonorte y el Grupo Afer, lo que le garantizaba a Macua también el apoyo de una parte del sector adinerado del PNV. Sin olvidar que es sobrino de José María Makua Zarandona, el que fuera Presidente de la Diputación de Bizkaia en los años 80 por el PNV.
No me inspiraba demasiada confianza en un principio. Me parecía el típico abogado que se presta a ejercer de "hombre de paja" al servicio de oscuros intereses que mueven los hilos en las sombras. El constructor Jabyer Fernández, con la colaboración de gente como Jon Arrinda, ya se hicieron en su día con el control de Bilbao Basket o Kaiku, y las malas lenguas decían que ahora preparaban su desembarco a lo grande en el Athletic a través de la candidatura de Macua y apoyados en el Grupo Correo.
Pero creo que durante la campaña el candidato ha demostrado tener personalidad propia y, sobre todo, ser el más creíble de los tres. Se ha desvinculado de cualquier compromiso con las empresas de Fernández y ha potenciado una imagen de autonomía respecto de los poderes económicos y políticos que me ha gustado. Era muy escéptico sobre sus intenciones, pero a día de hoy me parece el hombre más creíble, aquel que puede materializar sus promesos y devolver al Athletic la ambición perdida. Se ha esforzado más que el resto por hacerse con el apoyo de un amplio abanico de personas y sensibilidades distintas dentro del entorno social del club, configurando una plataforma que me recuerda mucho a la presentada por el difunto Javier Uría en 2001.
Juan Carlos Ercoreca me cae bien. Es empresario del sector alimenticio, dueño de una conocida cadena de supermercados en Euzkadi. Se le ve buena persona. Con intenciones limpias. Pero el hombre no tiene madera de candidato. Puede tener un buen proyecto deportivo asesorado por el experto alemán Horst Wein, pero no sabe venderlo. Su estrategia mediática ha sido pobre y limitada. Ha patinado anunciando a un inexperto Julen Guerrero, una figura polarizante, como su director deportivo.
Su mayor activo es el apoyo de una gran mayoría de ex futbolistas. Sobre todo de futbolistas que estuvieron en el club en los años del Presidente José María Arrate. Seguramente porque Ercoreca representa la continuación de esa élite llamada "los Arrate Boys" que han presidido el club desde 1994 y hasta ahora ininterrumpidamente. Gentes del entorno del ex Presidente Arrate, quien ha sido el dirigente rojiblanco más mimado por el PNV, que puso a su disposición toda su maquinaria de movilización de votantes en 1994 para derrotar a José Julián Lertxundi.
Por ello Ercoreca, apoyado públicamente por Arrate, ha sido considerado por muchos el candidato oficial de Sabin Etxea (ejecutiva nacional del PNV). Pero ha dado la sensación de ir perdiendo poco a poco ese supuesto apoyo. Especialmente porque en el partido no ha habido unanimidad. El candidato soñado del partido, especialmente de Iñigo Urkullu, presidente del Bizkai Buru Batzar, hombre fuerte de Imaz en Bizkaia, era el ex jugador y ex capitán del equipo, Genar Andrinua. Pero ante la negativa de este a presentarse, ha habido figuras del PNV vizcaíno, como el Diputado General José Luis Bilbao, que han podido posicionarse oficiosamente con Macua, facilitando a este el apoyo de medios locales como TeleBilbao, al tiempo que el partido oficialmente parecía apoyar sin demasiado entusiasmo a un poco ilusionante Juan Carlos Ercoreca.
Pero en las últimas semanas, también a la vista de la poca efectividad de Ercoreca haciendo campaña y sus pobres números en las encuestas, Macua ha parecido convencer más a parte del aparato de propaganda del partido. Con la colaboración de compañeros de plancha como Joseba Intxaurraga, antiguo consejero del Lendakari Ardanza, que sería Vicepresidente del Athletic si Macua gana las elecciones.
Por último, tenemos al tercer candidato. El freaky Javier González. Un ex agente de futbolistas que no me gusta un pelo. Es una mezcla entre el ex Presidente Fernando Lamikiz y Dimitri Piterman. Un cutre. No da la talla como Presidente y las formas le pierden. A la mínima dificultad perdería todo el temperamento. Está basando toda su campaña en el descrédito facilón de los demás. Un populismo cutre que cree que puede funcionar con una masa social muy deprimida y cabreada después de dos años deportivamente nefastos. Si es elegido Presidente y hace bien las cosas, no tendré problemas en reconocerlo. Pero de momento sólo puedo decir que me desagrada.
Así pues, me quedo con Macua.
Purga en la campaña de McCain
Despedidos o dimitidos John Weaver y Terry Nelson. El priemro de ellos ha sido el hombre más cercano a McCain desde hace años. Nelson es un hombre vinculado a Karl Rove, que tuvo un papel destacado en la reelección del Presidente Bush. Era uno de los estrategas electorales más solicitados para este ciclo electoral. Cuando McCain se hizo con sus servicios, esto fue interpretado como un gran triunfo del viejo Senador. Cómo cambian las cosas... con esta remodelación McCain espera despegar. Nadie apuesta por ello, pero ojo, no olvidemos cómo andaba John Kerry a estas alturas en 2003.
En la imagen: Gráfico de The New York Times
En la imagen: Gráfico de The New York Times
martes, 10 de julio de 2007
El poderío de Romney en Iowa
Entre los analistas de la carrera electoral republicana se empieza a tratar como una certeza inevitable la victoria de Mitt Romney en el Caucus de Iowa. Estos últimos días es habitual encontrarse, tanto en los medios convencionales como en la blogosfera, con artículos y editoriales que hablan de la ventaja organizativa de Romney en Iowa como una brecha insalvable para el resto de candidatos republicanos. Una realidad que la propia campaña del ex Gobernador de Massachusetts está tratando de estimular para que su candidato sea percibido como un ganador.
Pero Hugh Hewitt advierte en Townhall del engañoso efecto de esta cobertura mediática favorable a Romney en Iowa. Según Hewitt, Giuliani o Thompson debieran estar encantados de que la mass media de por ganador del Caucus a Mitt de forma tan prematura, ya que eso les permitiría hacerlo bien sólo con hacerlo mejor de lo esperado. Mientras Romney correría siempre el riesgo de lograr una victoria menos apabullante de la esperada.
También estos intentos de dar por decantada la batalla en Iowa pueden llevar a un menor interés, y a focalizar la atención en las, en principio, más competitivas primarias de New Hampshire, Carolina del Sur y Florida. En cualquier caso, esto no desacredita la acelerada estrategia del Gobernador Romney, que en mi opinión está siendo brillante. Buscar posicionarse antes que nadie como favorito en Iowa y New Hampshire. Históricamente ha dado buenos resultados.
Pero Hugh Hewitt advierte en Townhall del engañoso efecto de esta cobertura mediática favorable a Romney en Iowa. Según Hewitt, Giuliani o Thompson debieran estar encantados de que la mass media de por ganador del Caucus a Mitt de forma tan prematura, ya que eso les permitiría hacerlo bien sólo con hacerlo mejor de lo esperado. Mientras Romney correría siempre el riesgo de lograr una victoria menos apabullante de la esperada.
También estos intentos de dar por decantada la batalla en Iowa pueden llevar a un menor interés, y a focalizar la atención en las, en principio, más competitivas primarias de New Hampshire, Carolina del Sur y Florida. En cualquier caso, esto no desacredita la acelerada estrategia del Gobernador Romney, que en mi opinión está siendo brillante. Buscar posicionarse antes que nadie como favorito en Iowa y New Hampshire. Históricamente ha dado buenos resultados.
"2x1"
Bill y Hillary Clinton siguen con su tour por Iowa con el lema "Ready for Change, Ready to Lead". Explotando la fórmula del "2x1": vote a Hillary y llévese de regalo a Bill.
lunes, 9 de julio de 2007
Mark Warner
Este post es para decir que ya he colocado en Wikipedia la biografía en español de Mark Warner. Era mi favorito entre los demócratas para alcanzar la Presidencia en 2008. Un político joven que antes de entrar en política demostró ser un hombre de éxito en el complicado sector de las tecnologías. Esa experiencia lo convertía en un campeón de la recaudación de fondos para esta campaña.
De origen humilde, hombre hecho a sí mismo, pudo haberse dedicado a la práctica de la abogacía pero decidió arriesgar en el mundo de los negocios. Como Gobernador empezó a sanear las finanzas tradicionalmente desastrosas del estado de Virginia. Gobernó como un republicano en temas como la resposnabilidad fiscal o la aplicación de la pena de muerte, y con gestos hacia los sectores tradicionalmente demócratas en cuestiones de educación o salud. Pero su logró más importante en Virginia fue la recuperación del electorado rural para el Partido Demócrata. Demostró que un demócrata puede tener una gestión exitosa en un estado rojo intenso (rojo republicano) si realmente pone interés en comprender su realidad social y cultural.
Hubiera sido un magnífico candidato para los demócratas en 2008. Pero, incomprensiblemente, un buen día anunció que renunciaba a presentar su candidatura a la Presidencia. Puso como excusa sus deseos de pasar más tiempo con su familia y no alterar la estabilidad de esta con la campaña. Los mal pensados pronto empezaron a hablar de la posibilidad de que el ex Gobernador hubiera sido amenazado con algún dossier secreto que pudiera perjudicarle. Algunos hablaron de temas de faldas que pudieran salir a la luz. Otros, en cambio, hablan de un pacto secreto con los Clinton. No enfrentar a Hillary en las primarias, a cambio de asegurarle que será seleccionado por esta como su candidato a la Vicepresidencia. Ya veremos. En cualquier caso creo que así pierde toda su efectividad. Su lugar era la candidatura presidencial.
De origen humilde, hombre hecho a sí mismo, pudo haberse dedicado a la práctica de la abogacía pero decidió arriesgar en el mundo de los negocios. Como Gobernador empezó a sanear las finanzas tradicionalmente desastrosas del estado de Virginia. Gobernó como un republicano en temas como la resposnabilidad fiscal o la aplicación de la pena de muerte, y con gestos hacia los sectores tradicionalmente demócratas en cuestiones de educación o salud. Pero su logró más importante en Virginia fue la recuperación del electorado rural para el Partido Demócrata. Demostró que un demócrata puede tener una gestión exitosa en un estado rojo intenso (rojo republicano) si realmente pone interés en comprender su realidad social y cultural.
Hubiera sido un magnífico candidato para los demócratas en 2008. Pero, incomprensiblemente, un buen día anunció que renunciaba a presentar su candidatura a la Presidencia. Puso como excusa sus deseos de pasar más tiempo con su familia y no alterar la estabilidad de esta con la campaña. Los mal pensados pronto empezaron a hablar de la posibilidad de que el ex Gobernador hubiera sido amenazado con algún dossier secreto que pudiera perjudicarle. Algunos hablaron de temas de faldas que pudieran salir a la luz. Otros, en cambio, hablan de un pacto secreto con los Clinton. No enfrentar a Hillary en las primarias, a cambio de asegurarle que será seleccionado por esta como su candidato a la Vicepresidencia. Ya veremos. En cualquier caso creo que así pierde toda su efectividad. Su lugar era la candidatura presidencial.
domingo, 8 de julio de 2007
Romney y Thompson con los Young Republicans
Este fin de semana se ha celebrado en Florida la convención nacional de la Young Republicans National Federation. Los dos invitados estrella que se han llevado todos los aplausos han sido Mitt Romney y Fred Thompson. El ex Gobernador de Massachusetts se sintió como en casa. No en vano, su campaña financió la gran cena del sábado, y cuenta con el apoyo del director ejecutivo de la organización, Jon Woodward, que es también presidente de la campaña presidencial de Romney en el condado de St. John. Y el organizador de la convención, Brian Graham, también apoya a Romney.
Esto puede parecerles a los demás candidatos una manera de jugar sucio, pero lo cierto es que nadie les impide estar igual de bien organizados que Romney. El único que logró eclipsar ese ambiente pro-Romney fue Fred Thompson. La imponente presencia del ex Senador se hizo notar y algunos presentes dicen que se llevó tantos o más aplausos que el mormón. Thompson Wows Young Republicans
(...) Not yet a 2008 candidate, Fred Thompson energized young Republicans with a speech Saturday that was heavy on rhetoric and short on policy pronouncements. He branded Democrats as "the party of despair."
Chants of "Fred" and "Run, Fred, Run," greeted the actor and former GOP senator from Tennessee from many among the 350 people at the Young Republicans National Convention. The crowd interrupted his nine-minute speech with wild applause and mobbed him when he left. (...)
Parte del discurso de Mitt Romney ante el YRNF.
Discurso de Fred Thompson ante el YRNF.
Esto puede parecerles a los demás candidatos una manera de jugar sucio, pero lo cierto es que nadie les impide estar igual de bien organizados que Romney. El único que logró eclipsar ese ambiente pro-Romney fue Fred Thompson. La imponente presencia del ex Senador se hizo notar y algunos presentes dicen que se llevó tantos o más aplausos que el mormón. Thompson Wows Young Republicans
(...) Not yet a 2008 candidate, Fred Thompson energized young Republicans with a speech Saturday that was heavy on rhetoric and short on policy pronouncements. He branded Democrats as "the party of despair."
Chants of "Fred" and "Run, Fred, Run," greeted the actor and former GOP senator from Tennessee from many among the 350 people at the Young Republicans National Convention. The crowd interrupted his nine-minute speech with wild applause and mobbed him when he left. (...)
Parte del discurso de Mitt Romney ante el YRNF.
Discurso de Fred Thompson ante el YRNF.
sábado, 7 de julio de 2007
1960 Democratic Presidential Nomination
En 1960 nos encontramos en el escenario típico de un "final de reinado". Ocho años de Presidencia llegan a su fin, con un Presidente popular pero ya enfermo y desgastado, que ha pasado sus últimos años de gobierno entre el hospital y el Despacho Oval. El crepúsculo de la Administración Eisenhower es también interpretado como la retirada pública de la generación nacida a finales del Siglo XIX. La puesta en escena de una nueva hornada de jóvenes políticos que aspiran a tomar las riendas del país a las puertas de una década que augura cambios.
Existe entre el dominante Partido Demócrata la conciencia de que los ocho años de gobierno republicano han sido producto del liderazgo personal del General Eisenhower, y no un síntoma del avance republicano en la política nacional. Están convencidos de que pueden recuperar la Casa Blanca. El proceso de nominación nada tendrá que ver con el actual sistema. Las primarias abiertas sólo tendrán lugar en un puñado de estados no demasiado grandes.
En 1960 aún los comités estatales del partido y los barones territoriales siguen teniendo la capacidad de designar a gran parte de los delegados. Las primarias se utilizarán para ganar apoyos y tener una referencia sobre cual candidato cuenta con más apoyo popular y un mayor talento para hacer campaña. Aquellos que necesiten demostrar su viabilidad como candidatos y convencer al partido, participarán en todas las primarias. Otros, los pesos pesados bien relacionados con el aparato, optarán por esperar a la Convención para convencer a los delegados.
En total serán hasta 10 los demócratas que opten a la nominación: el Gobernador Pat Brown, de California; el Gobernador Michael DiSalle, de Ohio; el Senador Hubert Humphrey, de Minnesota; el Senador Lyndon Johnson, de Texas; el Senador John F. Kennedy, de Massachusetts; el Gobernador Robert Meyner, de New Jersey; el Senador Wayne Morse, de Oregon; el Senador George Smathers, de Florida; el ex Gobernador Adlai Stevenson, de Illinois; y el Senador Stuart Symington, de Missouri.
Fuentes: Wikipedia, Boston Globe y The Making of the President
(...) On January 2, 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy (D - Massachusetts) declared his intent to run for President of the United States. In the Democratic primary election, he faced challenges from Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. Kennedy defeated Humphrey in Wisconsin and West Virginia and Morse in Maryland and Oregon, although Morse's candidacy is often forgotten by historians. Kennedy also defeated token opposition (often write in candidates) in New Hampshire, Indiana, and Nebraska.
Despite fourteen years in Congress, Senator Kennedy had not established much of a power base in Washington, and was known more as a witty playboy than a political heavyweight. His religion also presented a major stumbling block, since no Roman Catholic had ever been elected to the nation's highest office.
Historian James Hilty writes that the Kennedy campaign "began earlier, spent more, and was better organized than any previous Democratic campaign." Their strategy was to win primaries to demonstrate John Kennedy's electability to the party bosses. There were only sixteen primaries in 1960, and most of them were in smaller states with relatively few delegates at stake. So they handpicked states where they thought they could win impressively, while working behind the scenes building support elsewhere.
Their first test came in Wisconsin, where Kennedy edged out Hubert Humphrey, the well-liked senator from neighboring Minnesota who had once been considered the front-runner. Attention next turned to overwhelmingly rural and Protestant West Virginia, where Kennedy needed to defuse the Catholicism issue in order to prove that he was electable.
In West Virginia, Kennedy made a visit to a coal mine, and talked to the mine workers to win their support; most people in that conservative, mostly Protestant state were deeply suspicious about Kennedy being a Catholic. In order to secure his party's nomination, Kennedy had to win West Virginia's delegates. Losing would effectively take the decision off the convention floor and throw it into the hands of the Democratic Party's powerful urban bosses, a development JFK was anxious to avoid because they would favor more seasoned party elders.
En la imagen: el Senador Hubert Humphrey
Four weeks before West Virginia primary day, the tide had turned against JFK and he found himself trailing Humphrey by 20 points. Kennedy responded by moving his key campaign aides to West Virginia, calling on close friends to volunteer their time, and training county campaign chairs in 39 of the state's 59 counties to staff phone banks, host receptions, and go door to door to distribute literature. In framing the catholicism issue as one of tolerance versus intolerance, Kennedy appealed to West Virginia's long-held revulsion for prejudice; placed Humphrey, who had championed tolerance his entire career, on the defensive; and attacked him with a vengeance.
Humphrey, who was short on funds, could not match the well-financed Kennedy operation. Kennedy defeated his rival soundly, winning 60.8 percent of the vote. That evening, Humphrey announced that he was no longer a candidate for the presidency. Kennedy knew the nomination was his if he could hold his delegates together once they reached the convention.
Kennedy emerged as a universally acceptable candidate for the party after his victory in the West Virginia primary. With Humphrey and Morse out of the race, Kennedy's main opponent at the convention in Los Angeles was Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic nominee in 1952 and 1956, was not officially running but had broad grassroots support inside and outside the convention hall. Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri was also a candidate, as were several favorite sons.
En la imagen: Bobby Kennedy, jefe de campaña de su hermano, en la Convención Demócrata de 1960, en Los Angeles.
Senator John F. Kennedy came to Los Angeles convention with 600 of the 761 delegates needed to secure the nomination. His political team (his brother Bobby, Kenneth O'Donnell, Pierre Salinger and Lawrence O'Brien) set up camp in Room 8315 of the Biltmore Hotel. The group worked to provide the remainder of support for the Massachusetts Senator, using timeworn convention tactics and old-line pressure. Bobby Kennedy, brother's campaign manager, was everywhere at the convention, commanding the Kennedy forces in an all-out attempt to swing undecided delegates their way.
Senator Lyndon Johnson had planned to sit out the primaries and present himself as a powerful compromise candidate at the convention. Since Johnson had supported oil depletion allowances (for tax purposes) throughout his career in the House and the Senate, important figures in the oil industry and the representatives of the oil states, headed by Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D - Texas), supported the candidacy of Lyndon Johnson. Rayburn was especially keen for Johnson to defeat Kennedy. These men knew that the Johnson candidacy could not be muscled by seeking individual Convention delegates. Their plans rested squarely on their control of Congress, on the enormous accumulation of political debts and uncashed obligations that, between them, Johnson and Rayburn had earned over years of the legislative trade.
Senator Lyndon Johnson portrayed the front-runner as being “too young and “too inexperienced”. Despite this dirty tricks campaign, Johnson was unable to stop Kennedy being nominated. The strategy backfired; Kennedy managed to win just enough delegates for a first-ballot nomination, despite last minute "Stop Kennedy" movements led by Johnson and others.
The presidential tally:
*John F. Kennedy 806
*Lyndon Johnson 409
*Stuart Symington 86
*Adlai Stevenson 79.5
*Robert Meyner 43
*Hubert Humphrey 41
*George Smathers 30
*Ross Barnett 23
*four others 3
That left Kennedy's choice of a running mate as the last major decision of the convention. At around 11 a.m. on the day a nominee was to be presented, John Kennedy visited Johnson in his hotel suite and offered him the vice presidency, despite opposition from many liberal delegates and Kennedy's own staff, including Robert Kennedy.
The selection of Lyndon Johnson as vice president was highly controversial. JFK actually wanted Senator Henry Jackson (D - Washington) as his running mate, and had offered the position to Johnson as a mere courtesy. After the Senate Majority Leader accepted, Robert Kennedy went to Johnson's suite to say that "JFK" had changed his mind. Johnson called the elder Kennedy to confirm this, and when it was not, the notorious "Lyndon Johnson/Robert Kennedy feud" was born.
En la imagen: un tenso Lyndon Johnson sigue el desarrollo de la Convención desde la habitación del hotel.
Kennedy’s close political advisers were shocked when Johnson accepted the post. They, like Kennedy himself, expected him to reject the offer. Why would Johnson give up his position as the second most powerful position in the country (Senate Majority Leader)? Kenneth O’Donnell was highly suspicious of Johnson’s motives. When he mentioned this to Kennedy he replied: “I’m forty-three years old, and I’m the healthiest candidate for President in the United States. You’ve traveled with me enough to know that. I’m not going to die in office. So the Vice-Presidency doesn’t mean anything. I’m thinking of something else, the leadership in the Senate. If we win, it will be by a small margin and I won’t be able to live with Lyndon Johnson as the leader of a small majority in the Senate.”
Politically, however, it proved an astute choice. Lyndon Johnson was an enthusiastic campaigner who gave the ticket credibilty in the South to win what was considered likely to be the closest election since 1916. But the success of their political collaboration would never erase the enmity between the vice president and the president's brother. (...)
Existe entre el dominante Partido Demócrata la conciencia de que los ocho años de gobierno republicano han sido producto del liderazgo personal del General Eisenhower, y no un síntoma del avance republicano en la política nacional. Están convencidos de que pueden recuperar la Casa Blanca. El proceso de nominación nada tendrá que ver con el actual sistema. Las primarias abiertas sólo tendrán lugar en un puñado de estados no demasiado grandes.
En 1960 aún los comités estatales del partido y los barones territoriales siguen teniendo la capacidad de designar a gran parte de los delegados. Las primarias se utilizarán para ganar apoyos y tener una referencia sobre cual candidato cuenta con más apoyo popular y un mayor talento para hacer campaña. Aquellos que necesiten demostrar su viabilidad como candidatos y convencer al partido, participarán en todas las primarias. Otros, los pesos pesados bien relacionados con el aparato, optarán por esperar a la Convención para convencer a los delegados.
En total serán hasta 10 los demócratas que opten a la nominación: el Gobernador Pat Brown, de California; el Gobernador Michael DiSalle, de Ohio; el Senador Hubert Humphrey, de Minnesota; el Senador Lyndon Johnson, de Texas; el Senador John F. Kennedy, de Massachusetts; el Gobernador Robert Meyner, de New Jersey; el Senador Wayne Morse, de Oregon; el Senador George Smathers, de Florida; el ex Gobernador Adlai Stevenson, de Illinois; y el Senador Stuart Symington, de Missouri.
Fuentes: Wikipedia, Boston Globe y The Making of the President
(...) On January 2, 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy (D - Massachusetts) declared his intent to run for President of the United States. In the Democratic primary election, he faced challenges from Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. Kennedy defeated Humphrey in Wisconsin and West Virginia and Morse in Maryland and Oregon, although Morse's candidacy is often forgotten by historians. Kennedy also defeated token opposition (often write in candidates) in New Hampshire, Indiana, and Nebraska.
Despite fourteen years in Congress, Senator Kennedy had not established much of a power base in Washington, and was known more as a witty playboy than a political heavyweight. His religion also presented a major stumbling block, since no Roman Catholic had ever been elected to the nation's highest office.
Historian James Hilty writes that the Kennedy campaign "began earlier, spent more, and was better organized than any previous Democratic campaign." Their strategy was to win primaries to demonstrate John Kennedy's electability to the party bosses. There were only sixteen primaries in 1960, and most of them were in smaller states with relatively few delegates at stake. So they handpicked states where they thought they could win impressively, while working behind the scenes building support elsewhere.
Their first test came in Wisconsin, where Kennedy edged out Hubert Humphrey, the well-liked senator from neighboring Minnesota who had once been considered the front-runner. Attention next turned to overwhelmingly rural and Protestant West Virginia, where Kennedy needed to defuse the Catholicism issue in order to prove that he was electable.
In West Virginia, Kennedy made a visit to a coal mine, and talked to the mine workers to win their support; most people in that conservative, mostly Protestant state were deeply suspicious about Kennedy being a Catholic. In order to secure his party's nomination, Kennedy had to win West Virginia's delegates. Losing would effectively take the decision off the convention floor and throw it into the hands of the Democratic Party's powerful urban bosses, a development JFK was anxious to avoid because they would favor more seasoned party elders.
En la imagen: el Senador Hubert HumphreyFour weeks before West Virginia primary day, the tide had turned against JFK and he found himself trailing Humphrey by 20 points. Kennedy responded by moving his key campaign aides to West Virginia, calling on close friends to volunteer their time, and training county campaign chairs in 39 of the state's 59 counties to staff phone banks, host receptions, and go door to door to distribute literature. In framing the catholicism issue as one of tolerance versus intolerance, Kennedy appealed to West Virginia's long-held revulsion for prejudice; placed Humphrey, who had championed tolerance his entire career, on the defensive; and attacked him with a vengeance.
Humphrey, who was short on funds, could not match the well-financed Kennedy operation. Kennedy defeated his rival soundly, winning 60.8 percent of the vote. That evening, Humphrey announced that he was no longer a candidate for the presidency. Kennedy knew the nomination was his if he could hold his delegates together once they reached the convention.
Kennedy emerged as a universally acceptable candidate for the party after his victory in the West Virginia primary. With Humphrey and Morse out of the race, Kennedy's main opponent at the convention in Los Angeles was Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic nominee in 1952 and 1956, was not officially running but had broad grassroots support inside and outside the convention hall. Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri was also a candidate, as were several favorite sons.
En la imagen: Bobby Kennedy, jefe de campaña de su hermano, en la Convención Demócrata de 1960, en Los Angeles.Senator John F. Kennedy came to Los Angeles convention with 600 of the 761 delegates needed to secure the nomination. His political team (his brother Bobby, Kenneth O'Donnell, Pierre Salinger and Lawrence O'Brien) set up camp in Room 8315 of the Biltmore Hotel. The group worked to provide the remainder of support for the Massachusetts Senator, using timeworn convention tactics and old-line pressure. Bobby Kennedy, brother's campaign manager, was everywhere at the convention, commanding the Kennedy forces in an all-out attempt to swing undecided delegates their way.
Senator Lyndon Johnson had planned to sit out the primaries and present himself as a powerful compromise candidate at the convention. Since Johnson had supported oil depletion allowances (for tax purposes) throughout his career in the House and the Senate, important figures in the oil industry and the representatives of the oil states, headed by Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D - Texas), supported the candidacy of Lyndon Johnson. Rayburn was especially keen for Johnson to defeat Kennedy. These men knew that the Johnson candidacy could not be muscled by seeking individual Convention delegates. Their plans rested squarely on their control of Congress, on the enormous accumulation of political debts and uncashed obligations that, between them, Johnson and Rayburn had earned over years of the legislative trade.
Senator Lyndon Johnson portrayed the front-runner as being “too young and “too inexperienced”. Despite this dirty tricks campaign, Johnson was unable to stop Kennedy being nominated. The strategy backfired; Kennedy managed to win just enough delegates for a first-ballot nomination, despite last minute "Stop Kennedy" movements led by Johnson and others.
The presidential tally:
*John F. Kennedy 806
*Lyndon Johnson 409
*Stuart Symington 86
*Adlai Stevenson 79.5
*Robert Meyner 43
*Hubert Humphrey 41
*George Smathers 30
*Ross Barnett 23
*four others 3
That left Kennedy's choice of a running mate as the last major decision of the convention. At around 11 a.m. on the day a nominee was to be presented, John Kennedy visited Johnson in his hotel suite and offered him the vice presidency, despite opposition from many liberal delegates and Kennedy's own staff, including Robert Kennedy.
The selection of Lyndon Johnson as vice president was highly controversial. JFK actually wanted Senator Henry Jackson (D - Washington) as his running mate, and had offered the position to Johnson as a mere courtesy. After the Senate Majority Leader accepted, Robert Kennedy went to Johnson's suite to say that "JFK" had changed his mind. Johnson called the elder Kennedy to confirm this, and when it was not, the notorious "Lyndon Johnson/Robert Kennedy feud" was born.
En la imagen: un tenso Lyndon Johnson sigue el desarrollo de la Convención desde la habitación del hotel.Kennedy’s close political advisers were shocked when Johnson accepted the post. They, like Kennedy himself, expected him to reject the offer. Why would Johnson give up his position as the second most powerful position in the country (Senate Majority Leader)? Kenneth O’Donnell was highly suspicious of Johnson’s motives. When he mentioned this to Kennedy he replied: “I’m forty-three years old, and I’m the healthiest candidate for President in the United States. You’ve traveled with me enough to know that. I’m not going to die in office. So the Vice-Presidency doesn’t mean anything. I’m thinking of something else, the leadership in the Senate. If we win, it will be by a small margin and I won’t be able to live with Lyndon Johnson as the leader of a small majority in the Senate.”
Politically, however, it proved an astute choice. Lyndon Johnson was an enthusiastic campaigner who gave the ticket credibilty in the South to win what was considered likely to be the closest election since 1916. But the success of their political collaboration would never erase the enmity between the vice president and the president's brother. (...)
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